Although in Drosophila pair‐rule genes play crucial roles in the genetic hierarchy that subdivides the embryo into segments, the extent to which pair‐rule patterning is utilized by different arthropods and other segmented phyla is unknown. Recent data of Dearden et al.1 and Henry et al.,2 however, hint that a pair‐rule mechanism might play a role in the segmentation process of basal arthropods and vertebrates. BioEssays 25:425–429, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

The concept of mimesis has been central to philosophical aesthetics from Aristotle to Kendall Walton: in plain terms, it highlights the links between a fictional world or a representational practice on the one hand and the real world on the other. The present collection of essays includes discussions of its general viability and pertinence and of its historical origins, as well as detailed analyses of various relevant issues regarding literature, film, theatre, images and computer games. The individual papers offer new (...) arguments for the specialist, yet in their sum also provide a solid and helpful survey of the current state of the debate. Contributions by P. Alward, G. Currie, D. Davies, L. Dole el, J. Hamilton, T. Kobli ek, P. Kot'atko, A. Kuzmicova, J. Levinson, A. Meskin, A. Pettersson, M. Pokorny, J. Robson, G. Rossholm, R. M. Sainsbury, F. Stjernberg, E. Terrone, K. Thein, A. Voltolini. (shrink)

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, shortages of scarce healthcare resources consistently presented significant moral and practical challenges. While the importance of vaccines as a key pharmaceutical intervention to stem pandemic scarcity was widely publicized, a sizable proportion of the population chose not to vaccinate. In response, some have defended the use of vaccination status as a criterion for the allocation of scarce medical resources. In this paper, we critically interpret this burgeoning literature, and describe a framework for thinking about vaccine-sensitive resource (...) allocation using the values of responsibility, reciprocity, and justice. Although our aim here is not to defend a single view of vaccine-sensitive resource allocation, we believe that attending critically with the diversity of arguments in favor (and against) vaccine-sensitivity reveals a number of questions that a vaccine-sensitive approach to allocation should answer in future pandemics. (shrink)

In previous work, Gregory K. Dow created a broad and accessible overview of worker-controlled firms. In his new book, The Labor-Managed Firm: Theoretical Foundations, Dow provides the formal models that underpinned his earlier work, while developing promising new directions for economic research. Emphasizing that capital is alienable while labor is inalienable, Dow shows how this distinction, together with market imperfections, explains the rarity of labor-managed firms. This book uses modern microeconomics, exploits up-to-date empirical research, and constructs a unified theory (...) that accounts for many facts about the behavior, performance, and design of labor-managed firms. With a large number of entirely new chapters, comprehensive updating of earlier material, a critique of the literature, and policy recommendations, here Dow presents the capstone work of his career, encompassing more than three decades of theoretical research. (shrink)

Mitochondrial replacement therapy (MRT) utilises nuclear transfer technology to replace defective mitochondria with healthy ones and thereby minimise the risk of a mitochondrial disease passing from a mother to her child. It promises much but comes with ethical controversy, significant risk of harm and many unknowns. Forming a position on MRT requires accurate information about the current state of knowledge, and an appreciation of the ethical issues at stake. Ethical deliberations will vary depending on the framework used. There are in (...) principle objections to MRT on the grounds of direct harm to human embryos and germline genetic modification. But even without these objections MRT can be weighed in terms of the balance between risks and benefits, alternatives and uncertainties. This paper explores the evidence and lays out the relevant issues to assist such a deliberation. (shrink)

Pike, Gregory K Drug abuse has come into the public spotlight again as the Australia21 group recently released several documents arguing for an end to the prohibition of drugs like cannabis, heroin, cocaine, ecstasy and amphetamine. The arguments are not new, and those who advance them probably think it is only a matter of time before they achieve their goal.

Pike, Gregory K In the year 2000, Canberra-based writer Melinda Tankard Reist placed notices and advertisements in various places about a project she was conducting on 'Abortion Grief'. Over 200 women responded, bravely prepared to tell their stories. The resulting book, Giving Sorrow Words: Women's stories of grief after abortion1 makes harrowing reading. Grief and pain followed these women down through the years and sometimes decades. Their accounts, as well as the numerous qualitative studies into women's experiences after Abortion, (...) and the anecdotal observations coming from post-abortion care services5 are evidence that abortion leaves a significant mark on some women. (shrink)

Pike, Gregory K Organisations agitating for legal euthanasia often use the term 'dignity'. They have discovered that it is more effective to avoid the words euthanasia or suicide and instead try to get 'dignity' somewhere in their name. Thus we have Dying with Dignity Victoria, Death with Dignity Oregon, and the Dying with Dignity Bill in Tasmania.

Pike, Gregory K On May the 10th this year, the Director of Southern Cross Bioethics Institute, Dr Greg Pike, was invited to participate in a public debate organised by the St James Ethics Centre in Sydney, as part of their IQ2 series of debates. The subject of this debate was "All drugs should be legalised", and Dr Pike spoke against the motion. The debate was aired on ABC radio national and televised on ABC2. The transcript of his address follows (...) - the main talk was followed by a brief additional section titled "Drugs and Human Rights". (shrink)

Pike, Gregory K The various levels at which misunderstanding exist with regards to stem cell research are discussed. The mismatch that exists between public perception and reality with regards to the same is highlighted.

Pike, Gregory K Eugenics is not usually a topic for polite conversation. The first thought that typically springs to mind is Hitler's euthanasia programme, the master race and the attempted extermination of the Jews. However, an examination of the social history of eugenics reveals that in practice it operated in many other contexts, and its conceptual meaning is much broader. And while that social history has usually been confined to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the core ideas (...) in eugenics have been part of dreams about the human condition for millennia. It is therefore not surprising to find various modern practices, some driven by new technology, subsumed under the rubric of eugenics. Eugenics as an idea is certainly resilient, even if at times it has been elusive. Indeed, perhaps it is resilient because it is elusive. In summary, eugenics is powerful yet poorly understood. Because it appeals to utopian dreams of a better future, where humans can be freed from their 'biological slavery', as Margaret Sanger put it, it remains pervasive even if cryptic. The new eugenics is sanitised, framed as autonomous choice, and unlike the ill-informed version of the 20s and 30s or the nasty Nazi variety. But it is nonetheless potent and its various manifestations are expressions of powerful ideas that remain firmly embedded in the collective human consciousness. (shrink)

Pike, Gregory K The Dutch government is debating extending its euthanasia scheme to 70 year old who wish to receive a lethal injection at the hands of specially trained 'suicide assistants' who wish to end their lives as there is nothing left for them to do. The government has been forced to consider the concept following a signature campaign by over 100,000 individuals for the same.

Reproductive coercion encompasses a collection of pregnancy promoting and pregnancy avoiding behaviours. Coercion may vary in severity and be perpetrated by intimate partners or others. Research is complicated by the inclusion of behaviours that do not necessarily involve an intention to influence reproduction, such as contraceptive sabotage. These behaviours are the most common, but are not always included in survey instruments. This may explain why the prevalence of reproductive coercion varies widely. Prevalence also varies when coerced abortion is included in (...) survey instruments. When it is, it seems roughly comparable in prevalence to coercion intended to impregnate. The extent and nature of coerced abortion can also be derived from studies that explore the reasons why women access abortion, the relationship between abortion and intimate partner violence, and online blogs and forums. This narrative review of reproductive coercion examines the evidence and attempts to comprehend why coerced abortion has been neglected. (shrink)

Scholars seeking to understand why some students and schools perform better than others have suggested that social capital might be part of the explanation. Social capital in today's terms is argued to be an intangible resource that emerges—or fails to emerge—from social relations and social structure. Use of the term in this sense has been traced to John Dewey's writings in 1900 in The Elementary School Record. The idea that outcomes in education are conditioned by social interactions has intuitive appeal. (...) Schools are more than learning factories where inputs are used to generate outputs; they are fundamentally social environments. Empirical evidence links social capital to higher student and school performance .. (shrink)

Catholic Social Teaching, in considering economic and patient justice, calls for “participating in patient care.” Corporations often are accused of not paying their fair share, which in turn has led to demands for government regulation to lower drug prices in the United States. Meanwhile, the millions of dollars spent by pharmaceutical foundations to help lower-income patients is not seen as corporations’ taking such responsibility to assist patients. The view that CST demands lower costs for prescription pharmaceuticals from corporations that make (...) excess profits misapplies CST principles and does not consider the pricing structure for drugs on a global scale. While a preferential option for the poor is needed, there needs to be a better definition of the poor. This paper looks to broaden the view of CST in regard to corporations and the preferential option for the poor when applied to the current cost of pharmaceuticals. (shrink)

Although research findings have always been subject to abuse, scientific advances and recent events have increased concern about the perils of some biomedical knowledge. The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs addresses this potential in its guidelines for physician–researchers. The guidelines do not advance many novel ideas or provide substantive guidance for PRs. Advocacy for professionalism, weighing costs and benefits, and balanced oversight are uncontroversial and have been proposed before. The difficult task is to define what they require, and here (...) the guidelines are vague. We discuss critically two issues that deserve careful attention. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 88-90.

Background: Despite procedural innovations and increasing numbers of uterus transplant attempts worldwide, the perspectives of uterus transplant (UTx) trial participants are lacking. Methods: We conducted a mixed-methods study with women with absolute uterine factor infertility (AUFI). Participants included women who had previously contacted the Cleveland Clinic regarding the Uterine Transplant Trial and met the initial eligibility criteria for participation. In-depth interviews were conducted in conjunction with FertiQoL, a validated and widely used tool to measure the impact of infertility on the (...) quality of life of infertility patients. Results: All (n = 19) rated their overall health as good; some experienced grief and social isolation. AUFI is a life-framing experience that influences acceptance by family, partners, peers, and one’s self. UTx is a means to gain control of reproductive autonomy. UTx allows family-building and the ability to play an active role in prenatal health and well-being. Establishing and maintaining a supportive relationship is a key issue of AUFI and when considering UTx. Risks of UTx are perceived relative to risks to self/child/family posed by adoption/surrogacy. Participants had no overall preference regarding living or deceased donor. Conclusions: The ways in which women with AUFI conceptualize this condition in their lives and choices around UTx and participating in a study of the procedure are multifaceted and textured. These perspectives are critical to understanding its ethical, legal, and social implications. (shrink)

Philosophy has much to offer psychiatry, not least regarding ethical issues, but also issues regarding the mind, identity, values, and volition. This has become only more important as we have witnessed the growth and power of the pharmaceutical industry, accompanied by developments in the neurosciences. However, too few practising psychiatrists are familiar with the literature in this area. -/- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry offers the most comprehensive reference resource for this area ever published. It assembles challenging and (...) insightful contributions from key philosophers and others to the interactive fields of philosophy and psychiatry. Each contributions is original, stimulating, thorough, and clearly and engagingly written - with no potentially significant philosophical stone left unturned. Broad in scope, the book includes coverage of several areas of philosophy, including philosophy of mind, science, and ethics. For philosophers and psychiatrists, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry is a landmark publication in the field - one that will be of value to both students and researchers in this rapidly growing area. (shrink)

This chapter introduces the edited volume, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Published in 2013, the centenary of Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathology, the chapter draws lessons from the last hundred years for the coming century. No predictions are made. Instead, five 'conditions for flourishing' are set out: 1) Particular Problems - the importance of focussing on well-defined particular problems rather than general theory building, 2) Product- orientation - remaining always responsibly product oriented in the specific sense that both sides (...) put in the work necessary to 'go deep' with each other's fields, 3) Partnership - working in partnerships of one kind or another, 4) Process - constant reflection on process based on peer review but leaving scope for the occasional rogue voice to cut innovatively against the grain, and 5) Q - a condition of a different kind, Q is an empirically derived measure of the balance between in-group cohesion and out-group openness required to support creativity. Illustrations are given of how these five conditions for flourishing have underpinned the rapid expansion of philosophy and psychiatry in the closing decades of the twentieth century, and, correspondingly, are also reflected in the Handbook as a whole. Overviews and commentaries on individual contributions to the Handbook are given in extended editorial introductions to each of its eight sections. (shrink)

This section concerns the question of how best to understand the scientific status of mental health care in general and psychiatry in particular. On the assumption that psychiatry is based, in part at least, on natural science, what is the nature or the general shape of that science? Some of the chapters aim at shedding light on component parts of a scientific world view: causation, explanation, natural kinds, models of medicine, etc. Others concern potentially fruitful scientific approaches to mental health (...) care, drawing on brain imaging results, phenomenology, enactivism and what can be learnt from debate of the status of psychoanalysis. One overall lesson is that twenty-first-century psychiatry needs twenty-first-century philosophy of science. (shrink)

This Section examines several moral dilemmas and epistemological aporias in clinical practice and shows how clinicians can benefit from the introduction of philosophical methods and discourse. The authors develop these issues having in mind emblematic mental disorders and typical clinical situations. One important claim shared by the Authors is that a great effort has been made to ground psychiatry on evidence-based science, and to tie it to our growing understanding of the human brain. This is obviously an exceedingly important project, (...) but it would be a mistake to assume that the central questions of psychiatry can be completely resolved through scientific inquiry. Science offers guidance for clinical practice only in light of our concepts and normative judgments. (shrink)

In the editorial introduction the stage is set for the chapters in the section by a brief discussion of the relationship between the disciplines of philosophy and psychiatry. Then each chapter briefly is summarized or highlighted.

In this introduction to the Section II, the thrust of the component chapters is described. An important strand in the philosophy of psychiatry since its beginnings has been sociopolitical critiques: criticism which aims to improve and humanize psychiatric practice and mental health systems. From this standpoint, the introduction provides an overview of this tradition, including considerations of "postpsychiatry," value commitments in psychiatry, the recovery movement, racism and sexism in the field, and technology.

A cross-disciplinary discussion of the basis of interpersonal relating is of interest to philosophers and psychiatrists for several reasons. The development of successful clinical practice may depend, at least partly, on having an accurate understanding of the basic character of unimpaired interpersonal relating because such understanding can shed light on the nature and source of its disturbed forms. How we think about the basis of "mind-minding" competencies influences how we think about the prognosis and possible treatment of dysfunctional interpersonal relating. (...) Another reason is that philosophical frameworks influence the way we think about and evaluate possible psychiatric disorders and philosophical discussions may be of direct practical importance to psychiatry given that different theories suggest different potential ways of devising therapies. (shrink)

The editorial introduction sets the stage for the chapter by identifying the roles that concepts and categories play not just in the field of mental health medicine but in the human mind itself. Then, each chapter is summarized or highlighted.

Following on from Section IV on summoning concepts, this section of the Handbook presents theoretically informed descriptions of psychopathologies. The topics of the chapters range from anxiety, depression, and body image disorders, through emotion and affective disorders, to delusion, thought insertion, and the fragmentation of consciousness. These phenomena call, not only for assessment and diagnosis, but also for understanding on the part of both the engaged clinician and the philosophical commentator. They also provide case studies for general philosophical questions about (...) different levels of description and conceptualisation and the relationships between them, and about the contributions to psychological understanding that are made by phenomenology, clinical expert knowledge, and the sciences of the mind. (shrink)

In this introduction to Section VI, the thrust of the component chapters is described. The classification and diagnosis of mental disorders collects a number of philosophical challenges to the field that call for responses from a variety of philosophical resources: hermeneutics, phenomenology, philosophy of mind, narrative theory, philosophy of science, epistemology-to name a few. The authors in this section address the general challenges in the classification of psychopathology, as well as address particular kinds of mental disorders, including autism, dementia, mania, (...) psychotic disorders, and personality disorders. (shrink)

Successful psychopaths, defined as individuals in the general population who nevertheless possess some degree of psychopathic traits, are receiving increasing amounts of empirical attention. To date, little is known about such individuals, specifically with regard to how they respond to ethical dilemmas in business contexts. This study investigated this relationship, proposing a mediated model in which the positive relationship between psychopathy and unethical decision-making is explained through the process of moral disengagement, defined as a cognitive orientation that facilitates unethical choice. (...) The results of the study supported this model, and implications for theory and practice are discussed. (shrink)

Relativism and contextualism are the most popular accounts of faultless disagreement, but Crispin Wright once argued for an account I call divergentism. According to divergentism, parties who possess all relevant information and use the same standards of assessment in the same context of utterance can disagree about the same proposition without either party being in epistemic fault, yet only one of them is right. This view is an alternative to relativism, indexical contextualism, and nonindexical contextualism, and has advantages over those (...) views. Wright eventually abandoned this view in favor of relativism for reasons related to a conciliationist view of disagreement between epistemic peers. I argue that he gave up on divergentism too soon. (shrink)

Does respect for autonomy imply respect for precedent autonomy? The principle of respect for autonomy requires us to respect a competent patient’s treatment preference, but not everyone agrees that it requires us to respect preferences formed earlier by a now‐incapacitated patient, such as those expressed in an advance directive. The concept of precedent autonomy, which concerns just such preferences, is problematic because it is not clear that we can still attribute to a now‐incapacitated patient a preference which that patient never (...) disaffirmed but can no longer understand. If we cannot make that attribution, then perhaps we should not respect precedent autonomy – after all, how can you respect patient autonomy by giving patients what they no longer want, even if they never disaffirmed those wants? I argue that whether an earlier preference can still be attributed to a now‐incapacitated patient depends on the reasons behind the preference, for a preference includes (and is not merely supported by) the reasons behind it. When the considerations that served as reasons no longer exist, neither does the preference which included those reasons. In particular, if the considerations that served as reasons for the patient exist only under conditions where the patient retains full mental capacity, then once that capacity is lost, so are those reasons and the preference based upon them. I use this analysis of precedent autonomy to ascertain the merits of various approaches to advance medical decisionmaking, including Nancy Rhoden’s approach, approaches based on a Parfitian personal identity analysis, approaches based on soft paternalism, and approaches based on the stability and longevity of preferences. Despite the apparent absurdity of respecting patient autonomy by giving patients what they no longer prefer but have never disaffirmed, I conclude with some programmatic remarks on when and why respect for (precedent) autonomy nonetheless requires us to respect former preferences. (shrink)

Most discussions of medical futility try to answer the Futility Question: when is a medical procedure futile? No answer enjoys universal support. Some futility policies say that the health care provider will answer this question when the provider and patient cannot agree. This raises the Decision Question: who has the moral authority to decide what to do in cases where futility is disputed? I look for a procedural answer to this question, an answer that does not turn on whether a (...) given party happens to answer the Futility Question correctly. I argue that these policies get it right; the provider should decide because providers have a right of conscientious refusal that extends to refusing procedures on grounds of futility. This is a procedural answer because providers have this right even if they are sincerely mistaken about whether a procedure is futile. (shrink)

Honoring a living will typically involves treating an incompetent patient in accord with preferences she once had, but whose objects she can no longer understand. How do we respect her precedent autonomy by giving her what she used to want? There is a similar problem with subsequent consent: How can we justify interfering with someone''s autonomy on the grounds that she will later consent to the interference, if she refuses now?Both problems arise on the assumption that, to respect someone''s autonomy, (...) any preferences we respect must be among that person''s current preferences. I argue that this is not always true. Just as we can celebrate an event long after it happens, so can we respect someone''s wishes long before or after she has that wish. In the contexts of precedent autonomy and subsequent consent, the wishes are often preferences about which of two other, conflicting preferences to satisfy. When someone has two conflicting preferences, and a third preference on how to resolve that conflict, to respect his autonomy we must respect that third preference. People with declining competence may have a resolution preference earlier, favoring the earlier conflicting preference (precedent autonomy), whereas those with rising competence may have it later, favoring the later conflicting preference (subsequent consent). To respect autonomy in such cases we must respect not a current, but a former or later preference. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 1, January 2022.

A majority opinion seems to have emerged in scholarly analysis of the assortment of technologies that have been given the label “synthetic biology.” According to this view, society should allow the technology to proceed and even provide it some financial support, while monitor­ing its progress and attempting to ensure that the development leads to good outcomes. The near‐consensus is captured by the U.S. Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues in its report New Directions: The Ethics of Synthetic Biology (...) and Emerging Technologies, which arguably marked the end of a preliminary round of analysis about the ethical and policy questions raised by synthetic bi­ology. Like a number of other, earlier documents issued by various groups around the world, the re­port called attention to questions about how the technology will be used; whether it might be mis­used; what sorts of accidents might happen along the way; the economic, environmental, and social impacts of the eventual applications; whether the very idea of “synthetic biology” should be trou­bling; and how the debate over all of these ques­tions will be conducted. Also like most similar documents, however, while it called for careful monitoring and oversight of technology, it did not recommend any significant new constraints on its development and use. The commission's stance was that it would be “imprudent either to declare a moratorium on synthetic biology until all risks can be determined and mitigated, or to simply ‘let science rip,’ regardless of the likely risks.”In this report, we will take stock of the current consensus, comment on some of the major points of disagreement, and identify the next steps for the debate. In part I, we offer a brief overview of the research and applications commonly grouped together under the heading of synthetic biology, partly in order to set the stage for the rest of the discussion and partly because we want to highlight some conceptual problems that attend the very la­bel given this field. In parts II, III, and IV, we take up, respectively, three broad classes of concerns that arise in the context of synthetic biology: con­cerns about the intrinsic or inherent value of do­ing synthetic biology, concerns about the concrete harms and benefits of doing synthetic biology, and concerns about justice. Addressing these concerns requires a method for bringing the public's values to bear on policy‐making concerning emerging biotechnologies; in part V, we discuss the chal­lenges in developing such a method. (shrink)